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THE IDEAL of the rule of law is probably best exemplified by judicial review.  It is a 
process whereby the exercise of public power is brought under scrutiny by an 
independent and impartial judiciary.  Traditionally, in judicial review, the court is 
essentially concerned with the legality, procedural propriety and rationality of the 
decision-making process, with limited scope of review of the merits of a decision.1  This 
traditional scope of judicial review was significantly expanded by the introduction of the 
Bill of Rights Ordinance in 1991, and more so by the coming into operation of the Basic 
Law on 1 July 1997, by bringing under judicial scrutiny not only the vires of 
administrative decisions but also the vires of the sources of power.  The court is now 
empowered to strike down legislative provisions which are inconsistent with the 
constitutional instruments.2  As Chief Justice Li remarked, ‘it is not an exaggeration to 
say that the phenomenon of judicial review has redefined the legal landscape.  Further, 
the availability and use of judicial review has had a significant impact on the conduct of 
the business of the government and has exercised considerable influence on public debate 
on many issues.’3  The parallel development of constitutional law jurisprudence, 
particularly in relation to human rights, also means that the boundary between 
administrative law and constitutional law is increasingly blurred.   In fact, development in 
one area reinforces and enriches the other.  However, for the sake of analysis, this chapter 
will concentrate on the traditional areas of administrative law.  
 
                                                
• Dean and Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong. 
1  See, for example, the classic statement of Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v 
Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at 410. 
2  The power of constitutional review existed even before the introduction of the Bill of Rights in 
1991, as the court could always strike down a legislative provision that was repugnant to the Letters Patent: 
see, for example, Rediffusion (HK) Ltd v Attorney General [1970] AC 1136. 
3  Speech of the Chief Justice at the Ceremonial Opening of the Legal Year 2007: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200701/08/P200701080120.htm. 
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I. Statistics and Threshold 
 
While there has been  a steady increase in the number of judicial review 
applications in the last decade, the number has remained more or less at about 140 to 150 
applications each year since 2004.  In 2001 and 2002, the number of applications for 
judicial review filed in the Court of First Instance was respectively 116 and 102.  Since 
2004, the figure remains relatively stable and stands close to around 150..   Thus, the 
popular public perception that there have been far too  many judicial review applications 
and that the number of which has been  escalating over the years is untrue.  Table 1 
provides the number of applications between 2001 and 2010. 
 
Year Number of 
Applications 
Year Number of 
Applications 
   2001         116    2006          132 
   2002         102    2007          143 
   2003         125    2008          147 
   2004         146    2009          144 
   2005         149   2010         134 
  
 Table 1: Number of Applications for Judicial Review 2001-2010.  I am grateful to 
the Judicial Administrator for kindly supplying me with the statistical information in this 
chapter. 
 
Compared to the eighties of the last century, there are many more judicial review 
applications these days.4  The increase can be accounted for by many different reasons, 
such as increasing complexity of the Government, better education of the public and 
                                                
4  Even as late as 1988, there were only 29 applications for judicial review: Re Sum Tat-man [1991] 
2 HKLR 601 at 613.   For an interesting account of the rise of judicial review in Hong Kong, see David 
Clark and Gerald McCoy, Hong Kong Administrative Law (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1993), ch 1 and Swati 
Jhaveri, Michael Ramsden and Anne Scully-Hill, Hong Kong Administrative Law, ch 2,  (LexisNexis, 
2010), and Johannes Chan, ‘Administrative law, politics and governance: the Hong Kong experience’, in 
Tom Ginsberg and Albert Chen (eds), Administrative Law and Governance in Asia (Routledge, 2009), pp 
143-174. 
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increasing awareness of their rights, higher expectation of good and fair governance, 
availability of avenues to challenge government decisions through the Bill of Rights and 
the Basic Law, willingness and innovation on the part of the legal profession to mount 
such challenges, sometimes on a pro bono basis, and frustration at the lack of progress on 
political reforms and the dominance of the pro-establishment forces in the Legislative 
Council, which has not been able to serve  as a platform for discussions, negotiations and 
resolution of conflicting views in the community.5   
 
A closer analysis of these figures reveals that in 2008,  of the 147 applications, 17 
applications were either not proceeded with or not yet dealt with.  Of the remaining 130, 
leave was granted in only 66 applications.  That is, about 49% of the leave applications 
were unsuccessful.  The situation in 2009 and 2010 was similar.  Of the  leave 
applications that had been dealt with, slightly over half of them (about 53%) were 
successful in obtaining leave    
 
Year Number of 
Applications 
dealt with 
Leave Granted Leave Refused 
    2008         130       66 (51%)         64 (49%) 
    2009         119       63 (53%)         56 (47%) 
   2010       12734      68 (54%)       56 (46%) 
  
 Table 2: Success rate in obtaining leave 2008-09.6  
                                                
5  For a more detailed discussion, see Johannes Chan, ‘Administrative Law, politics and governance: 
the Hong Kong experience’, in Tom Ginsburg and Albert Chen (eds), Administrative Law and Governance 
in Asia: Comparative Perspectives (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp 143-174.  
6  Source: Speech of the Chief Justice at the Opening of Legal Year 2010, 11 Jan 2010: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201001/11/P201001110174.htm, for the figures in 2008 & 2009; the 
figures in 2010 were kindly provided by the Judiciary. For 2008 and 2009, the figures provided by the 
Judiciary are slightly higher: 
 2008 2009 2010 
Leave granted 67 67 68 
Leave refused 66 73 56 
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At the same time, in 2008, among the 41 cases where judgment has been given, 
relief was granted in 15 cases.  If one takes as the basis the total number of applications 
dealt with, the success rate is only about 12%.  Yet if one takes the total number of 
judgments, the success rate is as high as 37%.  Of the remaining 25 cases where leave has 
been granted, it appears that a large majority of them did not proceed beyond the leave 
stage.  A possible explanation is that the Government was prepared to settle the claim 
after leave was granted.  If so, the success rate is even higher. 
 
Year Number of 
Applications 
Dealt with 
Leave 
granted 
Number of cases 
proceeding to 
judgment 
Relief 
granted 
 2008    130    66         41  19 
 
Table 3: Successful applications in 2008.  Of the 41 judgments, 4 were 
consolidated in one single hearing. The corresponding number of cases where 
relief was granted in 2009 and 2010 is respectively 14 and 9, but there is no 
information on the number of cases proceeding to judgment in these two years. 
 
Hence,  an interesting picture emerges.  On the one hand, about half of the 
applications were unable to get through the leave stage.  Yet for those cases that have 
successfully obtained leave, the success rate could be as high as 37%, that is, nearly one-
third. This could mean that the filtering process has been effective as most unmeritorious 
cases have been screened out.  Yet, given the high success rate, it could also mean that 
the filtering process might be too stringent, filtering cases which would otherwise have 
been successful.  
 
This brings us to the threshold for granting leave.  The threshold was raised at the 
end of 2007 in Chan Po Fun v Winnie Cheung.7  Previously, the test was known as the 
potential arguability test, namely whether the materials before the court disclose matters 
                                                                                                                                            
 
7 [2008] 1 HKLRD 319. 
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which on further consideration might demonstrate an arguable case for the relief sought.8  
In laying down this test the Court of Appeal expressly rejected the approach of requiring 
an applicant to show an arguable case. Instead, the court had merely to do a quick perusal 
of the materials available, otherwise the purpose of subsequent judicial review would be 
pre-empted. 9    This is a sensible rule as an applicant may not be in possession of all 
relevant materials at the time of making an application, which must be made as soon as 
practicable and in any event within 3 months from the date when the grounds for 
application arose, usually the date of the decision impugned.10  With a high threshold, it 
may invite arguments, delaying the application and even turning  the leave argument into 
a preliminary hearing of the substantive application—in this way giving the Government 
two bites at the cherry.  
 
The concern at the other end is that as a low threshold would invite busybodies, 
the Government and public bodies should be protected against unarguable challenges11 –
apparently a major factor in the Court of Final Appeal’s decision to raise the threshold in 
Chan Po Fun.  After considering the development in England, the Court of Final Appeal 
raised the threshold from potential arguability to reasonable arguability, requiring the 
applicant to show a reasonably arguable case.The court would need more than  a ‘quick 
perusal of materials’ to decide the application.  The Court also rejected a flexible test of a 
higher standard when the issue involved only statutory construction with no factual 
dispute on the ground that such a test would be unworkable in practice.12   
 
Since this decision, the success rate for applications for leave to apply for judicial 
review has remained at just above 50%.  Statistical information on the rate of success 
before this case is not available.  Such information is necessary before any firm 
conclusion can be drawn on the impact of the higher threshold for leave application.  It is 
                                                
8  Ho Ming Sai v Director of Immigration [1994] 1 HKLR 3. 
9  Ibid.  See also Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small 
Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 at 643-644, per Lord Diplock. 
10  Order 54 r 4, Rules of the High Court, Cap 4, sub leg. 
11  The former Chief Justice Li has warned against the proliferation of judicial review applications as 
a means to achieve political ends: see the Speech of the Chief Justice at the Ceremonial Opening of the 
Legal Year 2006 (9 Jan 2006) (available at www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/other_info/speeches.htm). 
12  [2008] 1 HKLRD 319 at 327. 
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also necessary to examine how far the new test has lengthened the leave application or 
whether it has resulted in more applications to oppose or set aside  leave and more 
extensive arguments on leave application.   While the higher threshold may deter 
frivolous or unmeritorious challenges affecting both the relevant public authorities and 
the public,, a high success rate in judicial review may be a cause for concern about the 
practices of public authorities. 
  
On the other hand, the court is prepared to grant leave if the case involves matters 
of public interest,  even when the issue in the case has become academic.  Thus, in 
Secretary for Security v Prabakar where the decision of the Director of Immigration 
refusing the applicant’s claim for asylum was challenged, the Court was prepared to 
consider the merits of the case, although the applicant had already left Hong Kong to 
resettle in Canada and no longer had any interest in the matter when the appeal was 
considered.13  This is a welcome move, as ‘very often in public or administrative law 
cases, the duties of public bodies fall to be exercised on a continuing basis not only in 
relation to the parties before the court but also perhaps to others in the future.’14   
  
The Court of Final Appeal has engaged in a wide-ranging number of issues in 
administrative law, and has delivered some major judgments which have far reaching 
implications or which have steered the development of the common law.  The following 
sections will focus on how the court has facilitated access to justice and enhanced 
procedural due process in disciplinary proceedings, followed by an examination of the 
vexed question of the delineation of judicial supervision and executive autonomy. 
 
 
II. Access to Justice 
 
Costs 
                                                
13  [2005] 1 HKLRD 289 at 301-302.  For further discussion on the grant of declaratory relief in 
matters which might have become academic, see J Chan, ‘Some Reflections on Remedies in Administrative 
Law’ (2009) 39 HKLJ 321-337.  
14  Chit Fai Motors Co Ltd v Commissioner for Transport [2004] 1 HKC 465. 
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The right to fair hearing has little significance if there is no access to a court in the 
first place.  Access to justice can be impeded by a number of factors, an obvious one 
being the sheer cost of litigation.  Indeed, the general principle of cost following the 
event is the singular deterrence to public interest litigation, as most publicly spirited 
litigants have limited resources and are very concerned about costs if the case is lost.   In 
this respect, the case of Town Planning Board v Society for Protection of the Harbour Ltd 
(No 2) is a welcome development.15   The case involved an attempt on the part of the 
Society to stop the Government from carrying out excessive reclamation of the Victoria 
Harbour.  The Court of First Instance and the Court of Final Appeal found in favour of 
the plaintiff, and both awarded cost to the Society on an indemnity basis pursuant to O. 
62 r 28(3) of the Rules of the High Court.   Without limiting its general discretion to 
determine the appropriate cost order, the Court of Final Appeal took into account the 
attributes of the parties and the character of the proceedings.  The case was brought, not 
to assert a private right, but to protect a public asset which was a central element in Hong 
Kong’s heritage.  There was manifest public interest in the matter. If legal proceedings 
had not been taken, the public interest in securing compliance with the law would not 
have prevailed and the fundamental legal issues involved would not have been resolved.  
The plaintiff had limited finances and was dependent on public donations.  These factors 
were relevant to the indemnity cost order, which, as opposed to a cost order on a party to 
party basis, provides a more generous basis for taxation and would allow the Society to 
recover most of its costs.  While the readiness of the court to make an indemnity cost 
order is a great encouragement to promoting public interest litigation, such an order is to 
be made only at the end of the litigation, which means that a public interest litigant would 
not be able to ascertain the financial position until after substantial cost has been incurred.   
 
In contrast, a pre-emptive cost order made at the beginning of litigation would 
have considerably allayed the anxiety of a public interest litigant.  Hong Kong courts 
have not been enthusiastic in making pre-emptive cost orders—understandably as such an 
                                                
15  (2004) 7 HKCFAR 114.  See also Chu Hoi Dick v Secretary for Home Affairs [2007] HKEC 1640 
and Leung Kwok Hung v President of the Legislative Council of the HKSAR [2007] HKEC 788. 
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order may put unjustifiable pressure on the other litigants.16  At the end of the day, it 
should be a matter of balance; if the concern is an extravagant manner of conducting 
litigation given a pre-emptive cost order, conditions can be attached to avoid abuse.  
 
Jurisdiction 
 
Another important decision of the Court of Final Appeal concerned a delineation 
of its own jurisdiction.  It is a common design in disciplinary proceeding of many 
professional bodies that an appeal against the decision of a disciplinary tribunal lies to the 
Court of Appeal, whose decision is final.  Such a finality provision in the Legal 
Practitioners Ordinance was challenged in Solicitor v Law Society of Hong Kong on the 
ground that it unjustifiably precluded the applicant from a further appeal to the CFA.17  
The Court held the finality provision repugnant to the Judicial Committee Act 1833 and 
two applicable Orders in Council, and hence not ‘law previously in force in Hong Kong’ 
within the meaning of Articles 8 and 18 of the Basic Law.  While it was possible for the 
Court to dispose of the appeal on this ground alone, it proceeded to decide the case on an 
alternative ground under the Basic Law.  The court seems prepared to accept that there is 
a right to have a dispute resolved by final adjudication by the Court because Article 82 
has vested the C F A with the power of final adjudication, albeit that this right to appeal 
could be subject to restrictions.  The restrictions, however, have to comply with the 
proportionality test, namely a legitimate purpose and reasonable proportionality between 
the limitation and the purpose., involving a consideration of the subject matter of the 
dispute, the nature of the dispute (whether it involved law or fact, substantive rights or 
procedural matters), the need for speedy resolution, and the cost of dispute resolution, 
including any appeal.  As it is necessary to obtain leave to appeal to the CFA, and leave 
will in general only be granted when the appeal involves a question of great, general or 
public importance, the leave is a sufficient safeguard to ensure that the final court would 
only allow appeals the outcome of which would be of importance to the legal system.  A 
blanket restriction of appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was therefore unconstitutional. 
                                                
16  R v Lord Chancellor, ex parte Child Poverty Action Group [1991] 1 WLR 347; Solicitor v Law 
Society of Hong Kong and Secretary for Justice (No 2)(Intervener) [2004] 2 HKLRD 754. 
17  Solicitor v Law Society of Hong Kong (2003) 6 HKCFAR 570. 
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While this decision reverses the conventional belief that the decision of the Court 
of Appeal on disciplinary matter is final, the decision itself is not surprising because 
courts have traditionally jealously guarded their own jurisdiction, not lightly accepting 
any legislative attempt at restriction.18   By contrast, in Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd 
v New World Development Co Ltd, the CFA rejected the argument that restriction on the 
role of lawyers to a purely advisory role at disciplinary hearings as violating the access to 
court under Article 35 of the Basic Law on the narrow ground that Article 35 applied 
only to formal courts and not disciplinary tribunals..19  It pointed to two dimensions to 
Article 35; the first being the protection of constitutional rights which had nothing to do 
with court proceedings (including he right to confidential legal advice) and the second 
being   the entrenchment of an individual’s rights in relation to ‘the courts’.  The 
reference to ‘choice of lawyers … for representation in the courts’, ‘judicial remedies’ 
and ‘the right to institute legal proceedings in the courts against the acts of the executive 
authorities and their personnel’ suggested that the word ‘courts’ referred to a formal court 
of law, as also in other Basic Law provisions referring to ‘courts’, where the expression 
meant formal courts.  
 
The reference to other provisions in the Basic Law is at best unhelpful, as all 
those provisions are found in Chapter 4 which prescribes the judicial system.  It would 
not be surprising that the reference to ‘courts’ in that context is confined to a formal court 
of law.  Yet this does not mean that a provision in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights 
should receive the same narrow construction.   Moreover, if it is true that the other 
provisions in Article 35 point to the direction that the reference to ‘court’ means a formal 
court of law, these provisions are equally capable of being given a more liberal meaning 
as the Court of Appeal did in several judgments.  It was also open to the Court to 
construe Article 35 in light of Article 14 of the ICCPR and/or Article 10 of the Bill of 
Rights, which clearly have a wider scope.  Nor did the Court give sufficient consideration 
to the fact that many decisions made by administrative tribunals could have far reaching 
                                                
18  This is best exemplified by the line of cases on ouster clause cumulating in the leading judgment 
in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147.  
19  (2006) 9 HKCFAR 234. 
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implications on the lives of ordinary people, which on policy grounds should be included 
within the scope of Article 35.  The Court was obviously influenced by the fact that this 
was a pre-emptive strike as the action was taken before the disciplinary hearing was held 
so that the court was put into a position to speculate what the effect of restricting the role 
of lawyers would have on the fairness of the proceeding.20  Yet by adopting a narrow 
interpretation of the word ‘court’ in Article 35, the Court has deprived itself of a powerful 
avenue to  consider the constitutionality of any statutory restriction on fair hearing before 
disciplinary tribunals .   
 
Fortunately, the gap was covered by Article 10 of the Bill of Rights, and this was 
confirmed in the subsequent case of Lam Siu Po v Commissioner of Police.21  In this case, 
the Applicant was denied legal representation by Reg 9(11) and (12) of Police (Discipline) 
Regulations, which served as an absolute ban on legal representation in police 
disciplinary proceedings.  He abandoned his argument on Article 35 of the Basic Law 
before the CA  as the CFA had by then handed down its judgment in Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong v New World Development Ltd.22  The unsuccessful appeal before the CA  
focused solely on Article 14 of the ICCPR, which also formed the main argument before 
the CFA.  After extensive reference to the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee 
and the European Court of Human Rights, the CFA concluded that Article 10 was 
engaged in relation to disciplinary proceeding which had a direct and highly adverse 
impact on one’s livelihood and pension.  The nature of the police force was insufficient to 
justify any departure from the protection of fair hearing in Article 10, and the effective 
functioning of the police would not be impaired by allowing its disciplinary tribunal a 
discretion to permit an officer to be legally represented where fairness so dictated.  It is 
interesting to observe that, in tracing the development of the right to a court in Article 
14.1 of the ICCPR and Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (the 
equivalent of Article 10 of the Bill of Rights), the Court noted that these provisions were 
not originally intended to apply to decisions of administrative tribunals or to the legal 
                                                
20  See, in particular, the judgment of Bokhary PJ at 243. 
21  (2009) 12 HKCFAR 237. 
22  This case also highlights the importance and continued relevance of the Bill of Rights in 
constitutional review cases. 
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relations between, for instance, civil servants and the State which employs them, but 
these restrictions were ‘of no more than historical interest’.23   This is in stark contrast to 
the approach adopted by the Court in Stock Exchange of Hong Kong v New World 
Development Co Ltd where the Court largely confined itself to a literal analysis of the 
relevant provision! 
 
The significance of Lam Siu Po is that it extends the Court’s constitutional 
jurisdiction to all kinds of disciplinary proceedings, a gap that has been left open by its 
decision in New World Development Co Ltd.  The decision has since then been applied to 
disciplinary proceedings of other law enforcement agencies, civil servants, and the 
medical profession, and the list is far from being exhaustive.  On the other hand, Article 
10 does not apply to every administrative or disciplinary decision.  It is necessary to show 
that the decisions determine some civil rights and obligations, and the Court has not laid 
down any guidance to determine what constitutes ‘civil rights and obligations’, save that 
it is prepared to adopt a broad and common sense construction of this term.  In these 
cases, the Court took into account the terminal nature of the decision, the impact of the 
decision on the pension rights or reputation or the continuing practice as a member of a 
professional body, and accepted that the right to employment constituted a civil right for 
this purpose. 
  
 
III. Retrospectivity and Extension of Time to Appeal 
 
As a result of the CFA judgment in Lam Siu Po, many police officers sought to 
overturn their disciplinary convictions on the ground that they had been denied legal 
representation.  In most of these cases, the application for leave to apply for judicial 
review, 24 or if leave had previously been granted, an application to include a new ground 
                                                
23  Ibid, at 267, para 74, per Riberio PJ, citing Lord Walker in Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets London 
Borough Council [2003] 2 AC 430 at 464, para 109. 
24  See Tsui Kin Kwok Johnnie v Commissioner of Police, HCAL 50/2009; Yiu Sung Chi & Lam Yau 
Tak Joseph v Commissioner of Police, HCAL 101 & 102/2009); Tsui Chun Fai Danny v Commissioner of 
Police, HCAL 131/2009); Li Kin Wah & Yung Kam Cheung, HCAL 126/2009 & 6/2010); Wong Chi Keung 
& Others v Commissioner of Police, HCAL 1/2010, HCAL 20/2010 & HCAL 21/2010).  
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to take advantage of the decision in Lam Siu Po,25 or an application for an extension of 
time to appeal to the CA or CFA on the basis of Lam Siu Po,26 were lodged long out of 
time.  The courts had not been entirely consistent in handling these applications.27  The 
matter was eventually resolved by the CFA in Clarence Chan v Commissioner of Police 
in favour of finality of litigation.28  It was held that the mere fact that the law has been 
changed in favour of a litigant who had previously lost on that view of the law was not a 
sufficient reason to justify an extension of time for appeal.  Such extension could only be 
justified on very rare occasions of exceptional circumstances.  
 
While the issue was resolved by a refusal to exercise  discretion to grant an 
extension of time for appeal, the aftermath of Lam Siu Po highlights the problem of 
retrospective operation of the common law.  It is an inherent feature of the common law 
that the court in deciding a case is necessarily applying the principle to some events in the 
past, and hence the common law, by necessity, operates retrospectively.  This poses a 
major challenge to our system of justice when a settled principle of law is reversed, as 
there may be numerous past decisions or actions that were based on the previous 
erroneous view of the law and may potentially be open to challenge, sometimes long after 
the decisions had been made.  In the normal course of events, the time limit for filing a 
case or lodging an appeal will take care of the situation, but the situation becomes more 
complex when the vires of the source of power is successfully challenged. In the Lam Siu 
Po aftermath, the question was whether the disciplinary conviction of a police officer 
should be upheld when the restriction of legal representation was subsequently found to 
be unconstitutional. 
 
                                                
25  Chiu Kin Ho v Commissioner of Police, HCAL 135/2004. 
26  Ho Ho Chuen v Commissioner of Police, HCMP 2276/2009; Chan Kang Kau Clarence v 
Commissioner of Police, HCMP 2824/2004). 
27  Leave to make an application or appeal out of time was granted in Chau Cheuk Yiu v Poon Kit 
Sang, HCMP 121/2010; Chan Ka Man v Commissioner of Correctional Services, HCAL 111/2009.  The 
Chief Justice explained these decisions as turning on the peculiar facts of these cases and did not decide 
any principles of law: see Chief Justice Li, ‘Reflections on the Retrospective and Prospective Effect of 
Constitutional Judgments’, in Rebecca Lee (ed), Common Law Lectures 2010 (Faculty of Law, The 
University of Hong Kong, 2011), p 21, at p 44. 
28  FAMV No 15 of 2010; affirmed in Lam Chi Pan v Commissioner of Police, FAMV 35 of 2010. 
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This give rises to the controversial issue of how far the courts can limit the 
temporal effect of its judgments so as to avoid disturbing decisions that have been made 
in the past or to avoid a legal vacuum in the future before necessary remedial measures 
can be taken.29   The CFA appeared to have accepted, without deciding, that it has an 
inherent power to engage in prospective overruling.30 It has also recognised that this 
question might depend on the understanding and extent of separation of powers and the 
particular relations between the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary in different 
jurisdictions, and as a result, this was not a question that might yield to a common answer 
in different parts of the common law world.  With such rider, Li CJ provided a helpful 
summary of the exercise of such power if it existed. He held that (1) if such a power 
exists, it is an extraordinary power that the court would approach its exercise with the 
greatest circumspection; (2) whether this power exists depends on the particular 
constitutional framework of the jurisdiction concerned, and there may not be a common 
approach across the common law world; (3) the existence and scope of such power may 
vary in different situations, as the same considerations do not apply to all situations in the 
different context of private law, criminal law or public law; (4) the existence of the power 
may also be dependent on the range of remedies that may be available; and (5) common 
law is developed by an evolutionary process and such development cannot be regarded as 
an application of the power to prospectively overrule.31  
 
 
IV. Disciplinary Proceedings and Due Process 
 
For a long time in Hong Kong it was believed that the standard of proof in 
disciplinary proceedings is a standard that is commensurate with the gravity of the 
                                                
29  For a more detailed discussion, see Johannes Chan, ‘Some Reflections on Remedies in 
Administrative Law’ (2009) 39 HKLJ 321-337; Chief Justice Li, ‘Reflections on the Retrospective and 
Prospective Effect of Constitutional Judgments’, in Rebecca Lee (ed), Common Law Lectures 2010 
(Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong, 2011), pp 21- 55; Kevin Zervos, ‘Constitutional Remedies 
under the Basic Law’ (2010) 40 HKLJ 687-718..   
30  HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa (2006) 9 HKCFAR 614; Koo Sze Yiu v Chief Executive (2006) 9 
HKCFAR 441.. 
31  HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa (2006) 9 HKCFAR 614 at 634. 
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disciplinary charge.32  This flexible standard is an acknowledgement that disciplinary 
charges involve allegations ranging from nothing more than a technical breach to 
something closely akin to criminal charges.  As Keith JA observed,  
 
[this approach] has the inestimable advantage of flexibility, and does not tie the 
hands of the disciplinary tribunal to a particular standard of proof, whatever the 
nature of the allegations and whatever the consequences for the person facing the 
disciplinary action.  The more serious the complaint, and the more dire its 
consequences, the greater the degree of proof required to prove it, even though the 
degree of proof required falls short of proof beyond reasonable doubt.33   
 
Thus, when the disciplinary charge was in essence one of indecent assault, it was held 
that the standard of proof has to be something similar or close to the criminal standard of 
proof beyond reasonable doubt,34 whereas if the charge was purely technical such as a 
failure to comply with certain procedural requirements or standards, it was held that the 
appropriate standard should be the civil standard of a balance of probabilities.35  
Unfortunately, flexibility also means uncertainty; the strength of this flexible approach is 
also its weakness.  In Pirie v Bar Council,36 Le Pichon JA observed obiter that ‘a party 
who has to defend himself against serious allegations which are tantamount to the 
commission of a criminal offence and which have serious repercussions on his 
professional career should not be placed in a situation where the ground rules for 
defending himself are elastic and the boundaries imprecise.’  The issue was eventually re-
visited by the CFA in Solicitor (24/07) v Law Society of Hong Kong.37 
 
                                                
32  The leading authorities are Tso Lo Hong v Attorney General [1995] 3 HKC 428 at 442A-B, per 
Litton VP; Wu Hin Ting v The Medical Council of Hong Kong [2004] 2 HKC 367 at 378D-G, per Ma 
CJHC; and Lai King Shing v Medical Council of Hong Kong [1996] 1 HKC 24. 
33  Lai King Shing v Medical Council of Hong Kong [1996] 1 HKC 24 at 27B-28B. 
34  Tso Lo Hong v Attorney General [1995] 3 HKC 428; Dr Mu Lie Lian v Medical Council of Hong 
Kong [1995] 1 HKLR 29; Wu Hin Ting v Medical Council of Hong Kong [2004] 2 HKC 367; Lai King 
Shing v Medical Council of Hong Kong [1996] 1 HKC 24. 
35  Solicitor v Law Society of Hong Kong [1997] HKLRD 63. 
36  [2001] 4 HKC 190 at 204. 
37  (2008) 11 HKCFAR 117. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3443079 
 15 
Having set out that there are only two standards of proof known to our law, being 
proof beyond reasonable doubt and proof on a preponderance of probabilities, Bokhary 
PJ first examined the standard of proof in civil cases where there was an allegation of 
criminal conduct.  Having satisfied that the appropriate standard of proof was the civil 
standard, and that the more serious the allegation the more cogent the evidence required 
to overcome the unlikelihood of what was alleged, his Lordship turned to disciplinary 
proceedings.  It was acknowledged that the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings 
‘must be clear and, at the same time, capable of accommodating the variety of 
circumstances in which it has to be applied from case to case.  It must lend itself to the 
just and proper disposal of all those cases.’38   The court then turned the standard of proof 
into a question of cogency of evidence, and held that:39 
 
‘the standard of proof for disciplinary proceedings in Hong Kong is a 
preponderance of probability under the Re H approach.  The more serious the act 
or omission alleged, the more inherently improbable must it be regarded.  And the 
more inherently improbable it is regarded, the more compelling will be the 
evidence needed to prove it on a preponderance of probability. ‘ 
 
Lord Morris provided a further explanation of this approach in Re H:40 
 
‘When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to 
whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the 
allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger 
should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established 
on the balance of probability.  Fraud is usually less likely than negligence.  
Deliberate physical injury is usually less likely than accidental physical injury.  A 
stepfather is usually less likely to have repeatedly raped and had nonconsensual 
oral sex with his under age stepdaughter than on some occasion to have lost his 
                                                
38  Ibid, at 166, para 112. 
39  Ibid, at 167, para 116. 
40  Re H & Others (Minors)(Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563 at 586D-G. 
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temper and slapped her.  Built into the preponderance of probability standard is a 
generous degree of flexibility in respect of the seriousness of the allegation.’ 
 
This explanation is almost self-serving, if not circular, as it begs the question why 
fraud is more unlikely than negligence, or why a stepfather is more unlikely to commit 
rape against his step-daughter.  It is almost suggesting that a “normal” person is less 
likely to commit a crime.  Besides, once the conduct alleged is criminal in nature, the 
heightened civil standard is hard to distinguish from the criminal standard in practice,41 or 
as Lord Bingham remarked, the distinction ‘is in truth, largely illusory’.42  While it is 
understandable that the court would like one single standard of proof in disciplinary 
proceedings, shifting attention from the standard of proof to cogency of evidence is 
largely semantic when the evidence required to discharge this single standard of proof is 
to be varied according to the probabilities of the allegations.       
 
In a series of cases, the CFA clarified a number of procedural matters pertaining 
to due process before disciplinary tribunals that are of far-reaching consequences.  In 
Medical Council of Hong Kong v Helen Chan, the issue was the role of the legal adviser 
in disciplinary proceedings.43 There are many disciplinary bodies, statutory appeal boards 
and tribunals for which a legal adviser may be appointed.44  In the case of the Medical 
Council, the office of legal adviser is created by the Medical Registration Ordinance (Cap. 
161), and by section 6(1) of the Medical Registration (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Regulation (Cap. 161, sub. leg. D), the legal adviser shall be present at every inquiry held 
by the Medical Council.  The legal adviser will give his or her advice on the legal issues 
in the presence of all parties after the Medical Council has heard all evidence and 
submissions but before it retires to consider its judgment.  The legal adviser will, 
however, retire together with the Medical Council and be present at its deliberation so as 
to ensure that the Medical Council does not inadvertently take into account irrelevant 
matters and to prevent any misunderstanding of the legal issues.  If necessary, he or she 
                                                
41  As observed by Lord Phillips in Gough v Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary [2002] QB 
1213 at 1243A. 
42  B v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary [2001] 1 WLR 340 at 354A. 
43  (2010) 13 HKCFAR 248. 
44  For a list of such bodies, see ibid, at 259-260, paras 13-14. 
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may tender additional legal advice, and will inform all parties of such advice.  The 
adviser will then prepare the first draft of the decision of the Medical Council in its 
presence.  The draft judgment will be scrutinized thoroughly and modified, if necessary, 
by the Council to ensure that it is not the product of the legal adviser but the collective 
product of the Council.  Given the increasing complexity of the issues confronting the 
Medical Council and the increasing expectation on procedural fairness, both the Court of 
Appeal and the CFA were supportive of this practice and were satisfied that its practice 
was well-intentioned and properly motivated.  The issues, however, remained whether the 
presence of the legal adviser at the deliberations of the Medical Council and the role in 
drafting the judgment were authorized by law and whether they would give rise to an 
apparent bias and injustice.   The Court of Appeal answered both questions against the 
Medical Council. 
 
The CFA found no express or implied statutory provision that prohibited the 
presence of the legal adviser at the Medical Council’s deliberations or permitted or 
prohibited his or her drafting the Council’s decision, leaving the matter to be resolved 
according to the common law.  Despite a long line of authorities that cast doubt on the 
presence of a non-member at the deliberative stage of a disciplinary or statutory appeal 
tribunal, the CFA drew a distinction between a non-member who acted as prosecuting 
counsel and a non-member who acted as legal adviser to the tribunal.  The CFA held that 
the presence of the legal adviser at the deliberative stage did not compromise the 
competence, independence and impartiality of the tribunal, the safeguard being the 
quality of the members of the tribunal.  As for drafting the decision, the Court found the 
practice acceptable so long as the legal adviser’s role is confined to recording and 
reducing into writing the decision, finding and reasoning of the tribunal.45 
 
                                                
45  The CFA emphasized that ‘the tribunal must deliberate without any participation by the legal 
adviser apart from giving it legal advice.  No drafting by the legal adviser may commence until after the 
tribunal – having so deliberated – has arrived at its decision and has made its decisions, findings and 
reasoning known to the legal adviser.  What the legal adviser drafts must embody the tribunal’s finding and 
reasoning.  The tribunal must scrutinize the draft.  If necessary, the tribunal must modify the draft to ensure 
that it is the tribunal’s product, not the legal adviser’s, and that it says what the tribunal means.’Ibid, at 274, 
para 62. 
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The Court further proffered two pieces of advice.46  First, the legal adviser should 
immediately before retiring and in the presence of all parties make a full and accurate 
statement of the practice that is to be followed, explaining clearly what he or she would 
or would not do, so as to allay the concern of all parties-- as well as to remind himself or 
herself and members of the tribunal-- of his role.  Secondly, the legal adviser shall take 
great care to make his or her impartiality manifest at all times.   
 
While this decision displays great pragmatism and will no doubt be welcomed by 
many lay tribunals, it may underplay the perception of bias.  The line between giving 
legal advice on the law, or on the consequence of a particular application of the law, on 
the one hand, and the merit of the decision on the other, is sometimes very difficult to 
draw. Moreover legal advice on what is permissible can occasionally influence the 
outcome.  The danger is even more obvious when the advice is on what is a relevant or 
irrelevant consideration. Thus, a reasonable person who does not know what goes on in 
the deliberation of the tribunal could have a legitimate grievance.  It is not about whether 
the tribunal or the legal adviser would adhere to their roles, which was the court’s 
concern when it posed the question of a reasonable fair-minded observer.47   
 
 In Yeung Chung Ming v Commissioner of Police,48 the Court had to deal with the 
vexed problem of the legality of interim action such as withholding part of the salary 
during the period of interdiction of a police officer pending criminal proceedings. The 
appellant, a police sergeant, was interdicted upon the laying of criminal charges against 
him, whereupon    the Commissioner directed that 10%, which was subsequently reduced 
to 7%, of his pay should be withheld during the interdiction.  After his conviction and 
dismissal from the police force, the appellant argued that the withholding of his pay prior 
to his conviction was a violation of the presumption of innocence.  The Court, by a 
                                                
46  Ibid, at 275, paras 65-66. 
47  Bokhary PJ observed that ‘fair-minded persons would, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
credit responsible bodies with adherence to the safeguards of their practices.  Being taken to be fair-minded, 
the hypothetical observer must be taken to be someone who would credit the Medical Council with 
adherence to the safeguards of its stated practice unless there is evidence to the contrary.: at 275, para 65. 
48  (2008) 11 HKCFAR 513. 
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majority, rejected the suggestion that any action taken against him on the basis that he 
might be guilty constituted a violation of the presumption of innocence.49  This must be 
correct, as the very act of charging a person with criminal offences must involve a view 
by the prosecuting authority that he might be guilty.  The proper test, as pronounced by 
the Court, is whether the Commissioner’s decision to withhold any proportion of the pay 
of an interdicted officer who has been charged with criminal offences implies a view that 
the person charged is guilty.  The test is an objective one.  The majority of the Court 
found no violation of his right, as he had been interdicted in the public interest, and 
during the period of interdiction, he was relieved from his duties and doing no work.   
The statute permits the Commissioner to withhold up to half of the officer’s pay, and the 
officer is entitled to the full amount of the pay withheld if he is acquitted after trial.  This 
decision is important as there may be many situations where an interim action might have 
to be taken against those charged with a disciplinary or a criminal offence.  It is important 
to note that there was no challenge against the interdiction itself.  Li CJ, writing for the 
majority, upheld the interdiction, as a police officer who was to remain on duty pending a 
criminal trial would seriously erode public confidence in the police force.50   The test 
used by the court would mean that most interim measures would probably pass muster.. 
Test proposed by Bokhary PJ in his dissenting judgment strikes a better balance between 
the interest of the State and the right of the officer concerned, namely, that ‘if a person is 
treated, by the conduct of the State, as if he is guilty or as if it does not matter whether he 
is guilty or not, this infringes the presumption of innocence’.51  As Bokhary PJ observed, 
‘indifference to a fundamental right or freedom is more insidious – and in that sense can 
be even more dangerous – than any open derogation from that right or freedom’.52 
 
Another important issue is the duty to give reasons for decisions.  As Lord Mustill 
stated in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Doody, the law at present 
does not recognize a general duty to give reasons.53  Nonetheless, there is a clear trend 
towards an insistence on greater openness of decision-making and the  duty to give 
                                                
49  Ibid, at 527, paras 25-28. 
50  Ibid, at 532, paras 46-47.  The majority of the Court did not address this issue. 
51  Ibid, at 531, para 44. 
52  Ibid, at 531, para 44. 
53  [1994] AC 531 at 564E. 
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reason has increasingly been imposed in various contexts.  In Oriental Daily Publisher v 
Commissioner for Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority, the CFA affirmed 
this trend.54  Without deciding on this issue, the Court indicated that it would, as a matter 
of statutory interpretation or common law principle of fairness, be prepared to assume a 
duty to give reasons unless there is contrary intention in the statute or it is otherwise 
inappropriate.  Such a duty would promote intellectual discipline, bring sharper focus on 
and attention to relevant issues, provide guidance to the community, enable the parties to 
decide any further course of action, promote transparency, enhance consistency in 
decision-making and law enforcement, and foster public confidence in the work of the 
tribunal.55  The Court held that not only is the Obscene Articles Tribunal obliged to give 
reasons, but the reasons must be adequate.  The adequacy would depend on the context in 
which the decision maker is operating and the circumstances of the case in question. In 
the case of obscenity and indecency, sometimes the content of the articles in question 
may be self-explanatory, but when this is not the case, the Tribunal would have to explain 
its decision.56  This welcome development enhances transparency and accountability of 
the administrative decision-making process.57 
 
 
V. From Wednesbury to Proportionality  
 
Another major contribution of the CFA is the introduction of the principle of 
proportionality to judicial review.58 A perennial problem in administrative law is the 
extent of judicial scrutiny.   For decades the principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness 
represented the orthodox position of judicial review.  This principle is heavily influenced 
                                                
54  [1998] 4 HKC 505 at 513H-515B. 
55  Ibid, at 515C-H 
56  In that particular case, the pictures involved some photographs of semi-naked females, and the 
Court found that if these photographs were considered indecent, the Tribunal would be coming close to 
holding that photographs of semi-naked females were per se indecent according to community standards.  
This is not self-explanatory and the Tribunal has to explain its decision: at 517-518. 
57  See also Re SJM Holdings Ltd [2009] 1 HKLRD 321; Wong Hin Hang v Hong Kong Housing 
Authority [2009] HKEC 1151; Ming Pao Newspaper Ltd v Obscene Articles Tribunal [2008] HKEC 1750; 
Three Weekly Ltd v Obscene Articles Tribunal [2007] 3 HKLRD 673. 
58  For a more detailed discussion, see Johannes Chan, ‘A Sliding Scale of Reasonableness in Judicial 
Review’ [2006] Acta Juridica 233-256. 
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by the doctrine of the separation of powers, under which the proper role of the judiciary 
is to ensure the legality of administrative decisions, not to substitute them by its own.  .  
As modern administration becomes increasingly complex, and when administrative 
discretion encroaches on almost every aspect of daily life, it comes as no surprise that the 
courts are increasingly dissatisfied with the narrow scope of the Wednesbury test.  The 
strongest attack probably came from Lord Cooke in R(Daly) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department who prophesized that ‘the day will come when it will be more widely 
recognized that the Wednesbury test was an unfortunately retrogressive decision in 
English administrative law, in so far as it suggested that there are degrees of 
unreasonableness and that only a very extreme degree can bring an administrative 
decision within the legitimate scope of judicial invalidation.’59 
 
As a partial response to the narrow scope of Wednesbury unreasonableness, the 
court introduced a ‘heightened scrutiny’ test when fundamental rights or liberty are at 
stake, dealing not with the process of decision making alone, but also on the merits of the 
decision.  Thus, in R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex p A, Lord Woolf MR said:60 
 
‘What is important to note is that when a fundamental right such as the right to 
life is engaged, the options available to the reasonable decision-maker are 
curtailed.  They are curtailed because it is unreasonable to reach a decision which 
contravenes or could contravene human rights unless there are sufficiently 
significant countervailing considerations.  In other words it is not open to the 
decision-maker to risk interfering with fundamental rights in the absence of 
compelling justification.  Even the broadest discretion is constrained by the need 
for there to be countervailing circumstances justifying interference with human 
rights.  The courts will anxiously scrutinize the strength of the countervailing 
circumstances and the degree of the interference with the human right involved 
and then apply the test accepted by Sir Thomas Bingham MR in R v Ministry of 
Defence, ex p Smith [1996] QB 517, which is not in issue.’ (emphasis supplied). 
                                                
59  [2001] 2 AC 532 at 549. 
60  [2000] 1 WLR 1855 at 1867 para 37. 
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In a similar tone, the CFA held that when personal liberty is at stake, the Court 
would demand the highest standard of fairness and subject the decision to the most 
rigorous scrutiny.61 
 
The principle of proportionality, developed notably in international human rights 
jurisprudence, has quickly found its way into domestic law in human rights matters.62  
The proportionality test acknowledges the central role of the courts in ensuring that 
administrative discretion cannot be exercised in a way that undermines fundamental 
human rights.  As Lord Steyn pointed out, ‘the doctrine of proportionality may require 
the reviewing court to assess the balance which the decision maker has struck, not merely 
whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable decisions.’63  It goes beyond the 
traditional grounds of review ‘inasmuch as it may require attention to be directed to the 
relative weight accorded to interests and considerations.’64   
 
With the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 in Britain, the 
proportionality test is now firmly rooted in English human rights law.  Yet despite the 
increasing influence of the jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights in 
the United Kingdom, an attempt to introduce proportionality as the fourth ground for 
judicial review has been unsuccessful.65  This gives rise to a strange situation that in 
human rights cases, the court will adopt the proportionality test or a heightened scrutiny 
test; otherwise the Wednesbury unreasonableness test remains the guiding principle.  In 
the UK, upon the introduction of the Human Rights Act, it has been forcefully argued 
that it is only a matter of time that proportionality will be accepted in English 
                                                
61  Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabaker [2005] 1 HKLRD 289 at 302B-G. 
62  See, for example, Handyside v United Kingdom (1980) 1 EHRR 347 at para 49; Sunday Times v 
United Kingdom (1980) 2 EHRR 245 at para 62; Norris v Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 186 at para 41; R (Daly) 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532 at para 27; R v Shayler [2003] 1 AC 247 at 
paras 60-61; R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200; De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1 AC 69; S v Makwanyane (1995) 3 SA 391; Leung 
Kwok Hung v HKSAR [2005] 3 HKLRD 164 at 183. 
63  R(Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001]2 AC 532 at 547. 
64  Ibid. 
65  An argument that proportionality constituted a fourth ground for judicial review alongside 
illegality, procedural irregularities and impropriety was rejected by the House of Lords in R v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696. 
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administrative law.66  In Hong Kong, after the Bill of Rights and the Basic Law, the court 
has readily accepted the proportionality test in assessing the constitutionality of any 
restriction on fundamental rights.67    
 
An attempt to bring together this parallel concept of proportionality and 
Wednesbury unreasonableness is the introduction of the so-called ‘sliding scale of 
intensity of scrutiny test’. This concept of a sliding scale of intensity of scrutiny first 
appeared in the judgment of Laws LJ in R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department :  
 
‘… in a case involving human rights the second approach which I outlined at 
paragraph 16 as to the intensity of review is generally to be followed, leaving 
aside incorporation of the Convention; but that approach and the basic 
Wednesbury rule are by no means hermetically sealed one from the other.  There 
is, rather, what may be called a sliding scale of review; the graver the impact of 
the decision in question upon the individual affected by it, the more substantial 
the justification that will be required.  It is in the nature of the human condition 
that cases where, objectively, the individual is most gravely affected will be those 
where we have come to call his fundamental rights are or are said to be put in 
jeopardy.’ 68 (italics supplied) 
 
Though confined to human rights cases69, there is no rational principle why the 
test of sliding scale should not be applied to other types of judicial review.70   The 
proportionality test itself embodies an inherent flexibility as the degree of cogency of 
                                                
66  Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 368-369; Jeffrey Jowell ‘Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards 
Constitutional Judicial Review’ [2000] PL 671; David Feldman ‘Proportionality and the Human Rights Act 
1998’ in Evelyn Ellis (ed) The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (1999) 117, 127 et seq. 
67  Leung Kwok Hung v. HKSAR  [2005] 3 HKLRD a64 at 183, per Li CJ.  See also R v. Lord Saville 
of Newdigate, ex parte A [2000] 1 WLR 1855 at 1867.  For a more detailed argument, see J Chan, ‘A 
Sliding Scale of Reasonableness in Judicial Review’  [2006] Acta Juridica 233. 
69  See also Sir Bingham MR in R v Ministry of Defence, ex p Smith: [1996] QB 517 at 554. 
69  See also Sir Bingham MR in R v Ministry of Defence, ex p Smith: [1996] QB 517 at 554. 
70  See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Launder [1997] 1 WLR 839 at 867 
per Lord Hope; Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1985) 162 CLR 24 at 41-42 per 
Mason J. 
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justification would vary with the importance of the interest to be protected.   Parliament 
could always be presumed to confer a power the exercise of which is confined to what is 
necessary for the statutory objectives, whether involving rights or other interests.  In this 
sense there is little difference between a proportionality test and a sliding scale of 
intensity of review.  These cases merely illustrate a general principle that the intensity of 
review should be proportionate to the gravity of the subject matter at stake, 71 and a 
violation of human rights simply provides a context that enables the court to exercise a 
more rigorous standard of scrutiny.  The proper issue would be what the intention of the 
Legislature is when it confers the powers on the public officer or the public body.  If the 
Legislature has decided to attach specific weight to a particular factor, it is only right that 
the Court should ensure that such a specific weight has been accorded in the decision-
making process.72  
 
This argument received some blessing by the CFA in Town Planning Board v The 
Society for the Protection of Harbour.73  The issue was the appropriate test to displace the 
presumption against reclamation of the Harbour which was described as a natural 
heritage of the people of Hong Kong under section 3 of the Protection of the Harbour 
Ordinance.  The Town Planning Board argued that section 3 created a mandatory factor 
that must be taken into consideration in any reclamation, but the weight to be attached to 
this factor was a matter for the Board, subject only to the Wednesbury test.  The Society, 
on the other hand, argued that, given the importance of the statutory objective to protect 
the Harbour, the Board has to demonstrate a compelling need before the presumption 
against reclamation could be displaced—which the CFA accepted. The need has to arise 
within a definite and reasonable time frame, taking into account the time scale of 
planning exercises, to be proved by cogent and convincing evidence.  As the need has to 
be overriding, the extent of reclamation cannot go beyond the minimum that is required 
by the overriding need, and each area of reclamation must be justified.  In the course of 
argument, the possibility of introducing a sliding scale of intensity of review was raised 
                                                
71  See Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v. Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1985) 162 CLR 24 at 41-42, per Mason 
J; R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Launder [1997] 1 WLR 839 at 867, per Lord 
Hope. 
72  Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd. (1985) 162 CLR 24 at 41. 
73  (2004) 7 HKCFAR 1. 
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by Sir Anthony Mason.  The Court of Final Appeal noted that  this issue deserved serious 
consideration and could well point to how common law should develop, but eventually 
found it unnecessary to resolve this issue.74 
 
This is the first time that the Court suggested that the proportionality test, or a 
sliding scale of intensity of review, was appropriate in judicial review of administrative 
decisions concerning subject matters other than human rights.  The test is flexible enough 
to encompass, as appropriate, a more rigorous review or the conventional Wednesbury 
unreasonableness. The sliding scale principle was eventually adopted in Society for 
Protection of the Harbour Ltd v. Chief Executive in Council (No 2), in light of the unique 
legal status of the Harbour.75  Quietly, the notion of proportionality has crept into the 
general principle of administrative law. 
 
A related issue is the question of deference.  Notwithstanding stricter scrutiny, the 
court is prepared to pay due deference to the views of the executive government in some 
circumstances, especially when allocation of resources or formulation of major policies is 
concerned.  A conventional justification for due deference is that the judiciary, being 
unelected, lacks the legitimacy to frustrate the will of the general public manifested 
through the elected legislature.  This justification is more relevant to constitutional 
review than in the classic situation of judicial review of administrative decision.  It can 
also be argued that the judiciary is entrusted with the duty to ensure that the executive 
government, and likewise the legislature, does not transgress the limits of the law, 
including the Basic Law.    This argument is stronger in Hong Kong when the Basic Law 
confers on the judiciary the role of constitutional review (or at least this role is assumed 
by the judiciary without much queries from the community), whereas in the United 
Kingdom or New Zealand, even upon the introduction of the Human Rights Act or the 
                                                
74  At 21-22 paras 67 & 68. 
75  Society for Protection of the Harbour Ltd v. Chief Executive in Council (No 2) [2004] 2 HKLRD 
902 at 929-930.  Despite the rhetoric, the manner the court applied this sliding scale test was not much 
different from the Wednesbury unreasonable test, highlighting the uneasiness of the court to interfere with 
the executive assessment of competing factors.  For a detailed discussion, see J Chan, ‘A Sliding Scale of 
Reasonableness in Judicial Review’ [2006] Acta Juridica 233.  
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Bill of Rights, it was explicitly decided that the judiciary should not enjoy the power to 
strike down legislation.   
 
The second justification for deference is institutional incompetence.  The 
judiciary does not have the expertise or knowledge to encroach on some executive 
decisions, as for example on the allocation of state resources--.  to some extent the basis 
of the Wednesbury principle.  Yet there are also many judicial review decisions which 
have had major adverse impact on the operation of the government.   The Harbour 
Reclamation case resulted in setting aside many years of planning for reclamation of the 
Harbour and sending the reclamation plan (at least part of it) back to the drawing board 
again,76 whereas the decision in the public housing case would potentially affect over 2.4 
million residents in public housing.77  There are numerous examples of judicial review 
cases which have major public implications, and the court has not felt constrained in 
deciding these cases.  The strength of the court is to analyse objectively the evidence and 
to weigh competing interests and arguments.  This is a role that the court is well suited to 
discharge, regardless of consequences. Thirdly, this is not to say that the court should not 
give weight to the views of the executive government.  Rather, such view should form 
part of the weighing process.  Unfortunately, the doctrine of due deference has sometimes 
gone far beyond that and has resulted in an abdication of judicial duty.78  The issue of 
deference has determined the outcome of a number of cases involving social and 
economic rights,79 and these cases will soon reach the CFA.     
 
 
 
                                                
76  Town Planning Board v Society for Protection of the Harbour Ltd (2004) 7 HKCFAR 1. 
77  Ho Choi Wan v Hong Kong Housing Authority (2005) 8 HKCFAR 628. 
78  For an insightful discussion on deference, see J Jowell, ‘Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or 
Institutional Capacity?’ [2003] Public Law 592-601; TRS Allan, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Review: A 
Critique of “Due Deference”’ (2006) 63 Cambridge Law Journal 671-695; M Hunt, ‘Sovereignty’s Blight: 
Why Public Law Needs “Due Deference”’, in N Bamforth and P Leyland (eds), Public Law in a Multi-
Layered Constitution (Hart, 2003), at p 337. 
79  Kong Yun Ming v Director of Social Welfare [2009] 4 HKLRD 382; Fok Chun Wa v The Hospital 
Authority [2010] HKCA 136; Lau Cheong v HKSAR [2002] 3 HKC 146; George Yau v Director of Social 
Welfare [2010] HKEC 968, ; but also see Kwong Kwok Hay v Medical Council of Hong Kong [2008] 3 
HKLRD 524 and Cora Chan, ‘Judicial Deference at Work: Some Reflections on Chan Kin Sum and Kong 
Yun Ming’ (2010) 40 HKLJ 1. 
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Substantive Legitimate Expectation 
 
In the landmark decision of Ng Siu Tung v. Director of Immigration,80 the CFA 
extended the doctrine of legitimate expectation to cover substantive protection.81  Indeed, 
the first landmark case on legitimate expectation also came from Hong Kong.  In 
Attorney General v. Ng Yuen Shiu,82 the Privy Council held that where a public authority 
charged with a duty of making a decision promised to follow certain procedures before 
reaching that decision, good administration required that it should act by implementing 
the promise if the implementation did not conflict with the authority’s statutory duty.  In 
that case, it was held that, having promised to consider each case on its merits upon the 
discontinuance of the ‘touch base’ policy, the Director of Immigration could not retract 
from that promise by removing an illegal immigrant without affording him an 
opportunity to be heard.  This is sometimes referred to as procedural legitimate 
expectation.  The court has for some years been hesitant to hold that the promise made in 
such circumstances is enforceable, as it may unnecessarily hamper the Government’s 
ability to change a policy.  Thus, only a decade ago, the doctrine of substantive legitimate 
expectation was still labeled by the English Court of Appeal as ‘wrong in principle’ and 
‘heretical’83   
 
On the other hand, important as it may be, procedural legitimate expectation 
leaves an aggrieved person with little consolation and would not be conducive to good 
administration when he or she has relied on a promise made by the Government, and yet 
the promise could be withdrawn without any consequence.84  The challenge is to 
delineate the scope of proper judicial intervention without unduly tying the hands of the 
                                                
80  [2002] 1 HKLRD 561. 
81  For a detailed discussion of this doctrine, see Forsyth & Williams, ‘Closing Chapter in the 
Immigration Children Saga: Substantive Legitimate Expectations and Administrative Justice in Hong 
Kong’ (2002) 10 Asia Pacific Law Review 29-47; Li & Leung, ‘The Doctrine of Substantive Legitimate 
Expectation: The Significance of Ng Siu Tung and Others v Director of Immigration’ (2002) 32 Hong 
Kong Law Journal 471-496; Tai & Yam, ‘The Advent of Substantive Legitimate Expectations in Hong 
Kong: Two Competing Visions’ [2002] Public Law 688-702. 
82  [1983] 2 AC 629 
83  R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hargreaves [1997] 1 WLR 906 at 924-
925. 
84  See C Forsyth, ‘The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectations’ [1988] CLJ 238 at 
240. 
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Government when a change of policy is called for.  Over the years, the court has on 
various occasions held the Government to its promise.  In Wong Pei Chun v. Hong Kong 
Housing Authority,85 the Commissioner for Resettlement assured in writing that the 
residents at Rennie’s Mill could reside in the area indefinitely; many of them were 
nationalist soldiers of Kuomintang Government who came to settle in Hong Kong after 
1949.  Confining the principle of legitimate expectation to procedural protection, the 
court held that it was an abuse of power for the Government to breach the promise some 
35 years later when the Government decided to remove the residents in order to carry out 
urban redevelopment.   
 
The principle of substantive legitimate expectation received renewed interest in 
England in recent years86 and was finally and authoritatively established in Hong Kong in 
Ng Siu Tung.  Shortly after 1 July 1997, about 5,000 Mainland-born children of Hong 
Kong permanent residents claimed to have a right of abode in Hong Kong pursuant to 
Article 24 of the Basic Law, a status that they did not enjoy before the changeover.  To 
make the litigation manageable, it was agreed that a few representative cases should be 
chosen.  Some of the claimants were advised not to join the litigation, but were assured 
that they would be treated in the same way as the applicants in Ng Ka Ling, which was 
intended to be a test case.   In Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration,87 the CFA upheld 
the claims.  Subsequently, Ng Ka Ling was reversed by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress (‘NPCSC’) pursuant to Article 158 of the Basic Law, which 
provided that ‘judgments previously rendered shall not be affected.’  The applicants in Ng 
Siu Tung claimed that they were given the expectation that they would be treated in the 
same way as the applicants in Ng Ka Ling and demanded that they be granted a right of 
abode in Hong Kong.  In this sense they were claiming a substantive benefit.  The CFA 
upheld the claims of some of them and held that, where the conduct of a public officer, 
whether by way of promise, representation, practice or policy, gave rise to a legitimate 
expectation of a substantive outcome or benefit, it would be an abuse of power to refuse 
                                                
85  [1996] 2 HKLRD 293.   
86  See also R v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2000] 2 WLR 262. 
87  (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4. 
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to honor such legitimate expectation in the absence of any overriding reason of law or 
policy. 88  
 
While the principle is formulated in rather general language, the Court narrowed 
it down with a number of qualifications.  First, whether an expectation is legitimate 
depends partly upon the conduct of the relevant public authority and what it has 
committed itself to.  Secondly, while the expectation may arise from representation or 
conduct, the representation or conduct has to be clear and unambiguous.  The court 
accepted that many policy statements are necessarily couched in vague terms.  Hence, the 
more general a statement is, the less likely that the court will infer from it a definite 
promise or representation.   The requirement of a clear and unambiguous promise or 
representation may prove to be the most difficult hurdle for any claim for  legitimate 
expectation.  Thus, the court held that a general statement that the Government would 
respect the rule of law and abide by the court judgment was insufficient.89  Likewise, the 
court has held that there was no legitimate expectation of a periodic rental review when 
the Housing Authority refused to conduct a rental review in a deflationary economy 
(leading presumably to a reduction in rent as a result of a statutory cap), despite a 
consistent previous practice of rental review of public housing every two years for over 
twenty years on the ground that the previous rental review was non-statutory based and 
was conducted in an inflationary economy (which consistently resulted in a rental 
increase).90  The court further held that if a representation was reasonably susceptible to a 
competing construction, it would be wrong to adopt the construction most favourable to 
the person asserting the legitimate expectation.  Instead, the correct approach would be to 
accept the interpretation applied by the public authority, subject to the application of the 
Wednesbury unreasonableness test.91 This was particularly apt in relation to 
Government’s policy statements because, in general, no unfairness could arise when the 
Government acted on a rational view of its policy statements.92 
 
                                                
88  (2002) 5 HKCFAR 1 at 41, para 92. 
89  At 38, para 82. 
90  Ho Choi Wan v Hong Kong Housing Authority (2005) 8 HKCFAR 628 at 648-650, paras 50-55. 
91  (2002) 5 HKCFAR 1 at 44, para 104. 
92  (2002) 5 HKCFAR 1 at 44-45, para 104. 
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Thirdly, for an expectation to be legitimate, the benefits to be accorded must be 
what the claimant is legally entitled to expect.  It is not legitimate to expect a benefit that 
it is unlawful to be conferred.  Nor it is legitimate to expect the public authority to make a 
decision or exercise a discretion in a manner which is contrary to law, or which is outside 
the power of the public authority, or which would undermine the statutory purpose.93  In 
this case, the Government argued that once the NPCSC had given the interpretation 
which had the effect of reversing Ng Ka Ling, the Director of Immigration had no power 
to exempt the applicants from the requirement of having a one-way exit permit from the 
Mainland authorities as such an exemption would be unlawful.  The Court accepted this 
argument, but held that the Director would nonetheless have a general discretion under 
the Immigration Ordinance to permit the eligible applicants to stay in Hong Kong.  The 
Director argued that this would still be an unlawful fettering of the discretion of the 
Director, and if the Director exercised his discretion in favour of the entire class of 
claimants, it would undermine the statutory scheme.94  The Court responded that  
 
if the circumstances are such as to raise a legitimate expectation, the common law 
itself imposes a duty on the decision maker, grounded in the principle of good 
administration and the duty to act fairly, to take that legitimate expectation into 
account, so long as, and to the extent that, taking it into account is not inconsistent 
with the statutory provisions and does not undermine the statutory purpose.95   
 
However, the Court did reckon that to allow the entire class of claimants to stay in 
Hong Kong would be contrary to the statutory scheme which has been validated by the 
NPCSC’s interpretation.96    Those who relied on a specific representation of the Director 
of Legal Aid or the Director of Immigration were treated separately from those claimants 
who relied on general statements from the Government.  A crucial factor was that the 
former class was a determined class of people of a finite size.  It was held that exercising  
discretion in favour of a small and finite class of claimants to stay in Hong Kong to 
                                                
93  At 47, para 112. 
94  At 50-55, particularly paras 129 and 134-138 and 143. 
95  At 52, para 129. 
96  At 54, para 136. 
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mitigate the failure of  the original legitimate expectation would be lawful—a pragmatic 
solution in conflict between legitimate expectations and statutory obligations13397  It is 
difficult, however, to see why, as a matter of principle, that legitimate expectation should 
be defeated by the sheer number of beneficiaries, as Bokhary PJ stated in his powerful 
dissent: 
 
I do not regard the fact that an abuse of executive power on a large scale as a 
reason for letting such abuse pass unremedied.  Nor do I regard it as any part of 
the statutory purpose of the provisions in question that those provisions cannot be 
resorted to even when resorting to them would avoid an abuse of executive 
power.98 
 
Once an applicant succeeds in establishing a legitimate expectation, the 
expectation has to be properly taken into account in the decision-making process and is 
normally expected to be honoured.  This is so even if the decision involves policy 
consideration.  If effect is not given to the expectation, the decision-maker should express 
its reasons so that they may be tested in court.  In general, the failure to take account of 
the legitimate expectation would constitute an abuse of power.99  
 
Formulated in this manner, there is close resemblance between the doctrine of 
legitimate expectation and estoppel.  A major difference is that as legitimate expectation 
is grounded on fairness and good administration, it would not be essential to establish 
detrimental reliance.100  The rationale is that it is unfair and contrary to good 
administration to allow the public authority to renege on a representation or a promise of 
benefits without good reasons, and not, as in the estoppel, that an applicant has altered his 
or her position to their detriment by relying on a promise or a representation of the public 
authority.  At the same time, it could be difficult to prove reliance in a legitimate 
                                                
97  At 26-27.  While Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga were regarded as ‘representative cases’, neither 
case was constituted by a court order to make the applicants representative parties. 
98  At 119, para 399. 
99  At 42-43, paras 94-98. 
100  The majority of the Court left open the issue whether detrimental reliance was necessary (at 46, 
para 110), whereas the issue was addressed at length by Bokhary PJ in his dissenting judgment (at 106-108, 
paras 354-359). 
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expectation case when the representation is made by reference to a large and innominate 
class of applicants and as Bokhary PJ pointed out, there was no good reason to deny a 
person of the benefit of a legitimate expectation of his or her class merely because he or 
she learned of the relevant representation after a decision disappointing it.101   In practice, 
there may be little difference whichever route is adopted, as there would be few cases of 
legitimate expectation where there is no detrimental reliance.   In any event, if the 
claimant has suffered no detriment, this could always be a factor that the court could take 
into account in determining the appropriate relief. 
 
The recognition of the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is a major 
development in the common law.  While the public authorities might become more 
cautious in making public statements, the various safeguards that the Court has 
established suggest that the court would avoid unduly trespassing upon the policy 
preserve of the executive. The doctrine greatly enhances the role of judicial scrutiny of 
administrative actions and the accountability of public authorities.  Ng Siu Tung soon 
became a landmark decision in the common law and has been followed both locally and 
overseas.102   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Unlike constitutional law where the court is charting into a completely new area 
and has to deal with the novel and difficult issue of delineation of powers between the 
central and the SAR Governments, in administrative law the court is building on well-
                                                
101  At 106, para 355. 
102  See R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Zeqiri [2002] UKHL 3.  It has 
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‘Closing Chapter in the Immigration Children Saga: Substantive Legitimate Expectations and 
Administrative Justice in Hong Kong’ (2002) 10 Asia Pacific Law Review 29-47; Li & Leung, ‘The 
Doctrine of Substantive Legitimate Expectation: The Significance of Ng Siu Tung and Others v Director of 
Immigration’ (2002) 32 Hong Kong Law Journal 471-496; Tai & Yam, ‘The Advent of Substantive 
Legitimate Expectations in Hong Kong: Two Competing Visions’ [2002] Public Law 688-702.  See P.Y. 
Lo, Chapter **, in this book. 
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established principles and making incremental changes and sometimes novel 
advancement.  That said, it is inevitable that the court, in exercising judicial scrutiny over 
administrative action, will be affected and guided by its perception of separation of 
powers between the judiciary and the executive.  The development of administrative law 
is further complicated by the increasingly blurred distinction between administrative law 
and constitutional law.  Under the Basic Law, it is possible to challenge not just the vires 
of administrative decisions, which are the conventional purview of administrative law, 
but also the vires of the source of power of administrative decisions.  In so doing, the 
CFA has shown great sensitivity towards the delicate delineation of powers between the 
executive and the judiciary.  It has established itself as a reasonably liberal court, striking 
a good balance between achieving good administration and governance on the one hand 
and respecting the rights of individuals and the rule of law on the other.  It has also 
shown to be innovative and is ready to explore the uncharted areas, such as prospective 
overruling or substantive legitimate expectation.  Space constraint does not allow us to 
survey all the important decisions of the Court in the area of administrative law.  What 
has been shown in this chapter is how the Court has contributed to enhancing good 
administration and accountability of public authority through liberal procedures 
facilitating access to justice, refinement of procedural due process, and review of 
substantive merits of administrative decisions through the doctrines of proportionality, a 
sliding scale of intensity of review, and substantive legitimate expectation. The Court has 
also been confronted with issues that have grave political consequences.  It has not shied 
away from such challenges, and has tried to do its best to develop a legal solution without 
losing sight of the importance of pragmatism and flexibility, though one may query 
whether the Court has on some occasions been too ready to achieve a pragmatic solution 
at the expense of a principled outcome.   
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